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STUDENT NoTEs

flow into other factual situations, for it is believed that it was here
that the courts hit upon the true interpretation of he statute.
STEVE WHrr

LIFE INSURANCE-CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY IN A POLICY IN
WHICH RIGHT TO MAKE SUCH A CHANGE HAS BEEN
RESERVED TO THE INSURED-KENTUCKY
RULE
The standard provision in modern insurance policies is that the
insured may, by written notice to the insurer at its home office, change
the beneficiary under the policy, such change to become effective when
it is endorsed on the policy by the insurer. Some divergence of opinion
exists as to the necessity for strict compliance with this provision. In
a few jurisdictions the procedure set out in the policy must be strictly
followed in order to make an effective change. The usual basis for
such a holding is that a condition respecting endorsement requires
more than a ministerial act on the part of the insurer, and the rights
of the original beneficiary cannot be cut off without a compliance with
such provision." However, by the great weight of authority, a change
of beneficiary can be accomplished without a strict or complete compliance with the conditions of the policy regarding the endorsement of
the insurer. These jurisdictions reason that the endorsement of the
change of beneficiary by the insurer is a purely ministerial act which
the insurer cannot refuse to perform, and that therefore a failure of
the insurer to perform such act will not defeat the change of beneficiary
if the insured has done everything reasonably within his power to
effect a change.2
The cases place Kentucky unequivocably with the majority of
3
jurisdictions upon this question. Manning v. Ancient Order of United
'Sheppard v. Crowley, 61 Fla. 735, 55 So. 341 (1911); Freund v.
Freund, 213 Ill. 189, 75 N. E. 925 (1905); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Deyerburg, 101 N. J. Eq. 90, 137 Atl. 785 (1927); Douglas v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 11 Ohio N. P. N. S. 531, 21 Ohio Dec. N. P. 516 (1911); Kress
v. Kress, 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 404 (1921).
"Reid v. Durboraw, 272 Fed. 99 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921); Johnston v.
Kearns, 107 Cal. App. 557, 290 Pac. 640 (1930); Reliance L. Ins. Co. v.
Bennington, 142 Md. 390, 121 Atl. 369 (1923); Kochanck v. Prudential
Ins. Co, 262 Mass. 174, 159 N. E. 520 (1928); Quist v. Western and
Southern L. Ins. Co., 219 Mich. 406, 189 N. W. 49 (1922); Re Lynch,
135 Misc. 406, 237 N. Y. Supp. 663 (1929); Teague v. Pilot L. Ins. Co.,
200 N. C. 450, 157 S. E. 421 (1931).
3
Manning v. Ancient Order of United Workmen, 86 Ky. 136, 5
S. W. 385 (1887); Lockett v. Lockett, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 300, 80 S. W.
1152 (1904); Howe v. Fidelity Trust Co. Trustee, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 485,
89 S. W. 521 (1905); Vaughan's Admr. v. Daugherty, 152 Ky. 732, 154
S. W. 9 (1913); Landrum v. Landrum's Admx., 186 Ky. 775, 218 S. W.
274 (1920); Twyman v. Twyman, 201 Ky. 102, 255 S. W. 1031 (1923);
Hoskins v. Hoskins, 231 Ky. 5, 20 S. W. (2d) 1029 (1929); Farley et al.
v. First National Bank, 250 Ky. 150, 61 S. W. (2d) 1059 (1933); Inter-
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Workmen4 is cited frequently5 in other jurisdictions, as well as in Kentucky, as an early and leading case supporting the rule that a substantial compliance is sufficient. The rule has increased, rather than
lessened, litigation, and the limits of "substantial compliance" have
not yet been fully defined.

WHERE THE FAILURE TO STRICTLY

COMPLY Is

DUE TO THE REFUSAL OR

NEGLECT OF INSURER TO ACT ON REQUEST FOE CHANoE

There is considerable authority in other jurisdictions for the view
that where the failure to comply with the provision for endorsement
of the change on the policy is due to the neglect 6 of the insurer, or to
the insurer's delay' in acting on a request for a change, the change is
to be regarded as complete. It is said to be in accord with better
reasoning that an insurance company cannot refuse to consent to a
change by which the insured's trustee in bankruptcy is made beneficiary.8 It has even been suggested that an insurer cannot refuse to
endorse a change of beneficiary on a policy.'
The Kentucky court has frequently stated that the provision
requiring an endorsement on the policy before a change can be effectuated is for the benefit of the insurer." Nevertheless, the few cases
which have arisen involving refusal or neglect of an insurance company
to make this change do not bear out the implications of this statement.
If the insurer fails to receive the request for change, or loses it before
making the endorsement, the provision does not protect the company.,
Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Cochran, 259 Ky. 677, 83 S. W. (2d) 11
(1935).
The suggestion (Note (1936) 24 Ky. L. J. 507) that the Kentucky
court has ever taken a contrary view is apparently erroneous; the case
cited, Manning v. Supreme Lodge, A. 0. U. W., 7 Ky. Law Rep. 752
(Super. Ct. 1886), was reversed on appeal in the case cited supra,
note 6.
486 Ky. 136, 5 S. W. 385 (1887.)
'Hoskins v. Hoskins, 231 Ky. 5, 11, 20 S. W. (2nd) 1029, 1032 (1929).
'Goodrich v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 111 Neb. 616, 197 N. W.
380 (1924); Hall v. Prudential Ins. Co., 132 Misc. 162, 229 N. Y. Supp.
228 (1928).
"Brown v. Home L. Ins. Co., 3 F. (2d) 661 (E. D. Okla., 1925);
John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. White, 20 R. I. 457, 40 Atl. 5 (1898).
sRe Greenburg, 271 Fed. 258 (1921); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Middlekamp, 67 Colo. 162, 185 Pac. 335 (1919); Urick v. Western Travelers
Acci. Ass'n, 81 Neb. 327, 116 N. W. 48 (1908).
'Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Olsen, 81 N. H. 143, 123 Atl. 576 (1923).
"Meadows' Guardian v. Meadows' Admr., 13 Ky. Law Rep. 495
(Super. Ct. 1891); Lockett v. Lockett, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 300, 80 S. W.
1152 (1904) (These cases involved assignments only); Thompson Extrx.
v. Thompson, 190 Ky. 3, 226 S. W. 350 (1920); Hoskins v. Hoskins,
231 Ky. 5, 20 S. W. (2d) 1029 (1929).
"Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Cochran, 259 Ky. 677, 83 S. W.
(2d) 11 (1935). (Accident policy; but there is no suggestion of difference from ordinary life policy on this point.)
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The change is effective in such case though the insurer remains in complete ignorance of it. A case more indicative of the court's attitude on
this subject is TVompso's Extrs. v. Thompson,1 involving the related
question of assignments. The policy provided for written notice of
assignment. The insured gave notice in writing, but the company
rejected it as too informal. The court held the assignment was valid
in spite of the insurer's refusal to accept it. In Tsuyinan v. Twymane
the insurer had refused or failed to formally endorse a change of
beneficiary on the policy because the insured had failed to fill out the
forms completely, through no fault of his own. The change was effected
nevertheless.
It seems evident that the provision is of no protection to the
company where the failure to endorse the change upon the policy was
a result of the company's neglect or delay. It is also reasonably certain
that the company cannot refuse to make the endorsement except for
the most compelling reasons of self-protection. The question is seldom
litigated, since the almost invariable practice of the insurer when more
than one claimant appears is to interplead and pay the money into
court. An early attempt on the part of the insurer to escape liability
on the ground that an ineffectual attempt to change the beneficiary
invalidated the policy was, of course, unsuccessful.V1 If the attempted
change is invalid for any reason, the rights of the original beneficiary
are not affected, and the original designation remains in force.5
WHERE THE INSURED HAS FAILED TO STRIcTLY COMPLY

Kentucky concurs with the universal holding" that where the
insured's failure to send in his policy for the endorsement of a
change of beneficiary thereon is caused by the refusal of the original
beneficiary to surrender the policy to him, the change will nevertheless
be given effect if he has otherwise substantially complied with requirements."
"An attempted change will be recognized as a valid one,
where . . . the insured has done all that he could do to comply with
1 190 Ky. 3, 226 S. W. 350 (1920).
" 201 Ky. 102, 255 S. W. 1031 (1923)
" Provident Savings Life Assurance Co. v. Dees, 120 Ky. 285, 86
S. W. 522 (1905).
Ibid., also Sturges v. Sturges, 126 Ky. 80, 102 S. W. 884 (1907).
"Nally v. Nally, 74 Ga. 669 (1885); Marsh v. Supreme Council,
149 Mass. 512, 21 N. E. 1070 (1889); Supreme Tent, K. A. v. Altman,
134 App. 363, 114 S. W. 1107 (1908); Burke v. Kiekebusch, 205 App.
Div. 503, 199 N. Y. Supp. 663 (1923); Taff v. Smith, 114 S. C. 306, 103
S. E. 551 (1920).
17Leaf
v. Leaf, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 47 (Superior Ct., 1890) (surrender of
certificate was unnecessary where original beneficiay refused to give
up policy, even though this beneficiary had paid some of the premiums);
Twyman v. Twyman, 201 Ky. 102, 255 S. W. 1031 (1923) (apparently
the original beneficiary had disappeared with the policy and could not
be found); Farley et al. v. First National Bank, 250 Ky. 150, 61 S. W.
(2d) 1059 (1933) (custodian who was not a beneficiary refused to
surrender policy).
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requirements."'" If the person having custody of the policy refuses to
give it up, the law will not ask the impossible by requiring the insured
to surrender it to the insurer for endorsement.
Kentucky has gone much further than other states in interpreting
attempts to change the beneficiary as a substantial compliance with
policy provisions. ' It is clearly established that if the insured fills out
the company's change of beneficiary forms, and mails them with his
policy to the home office of the company, his death before the forms
are received by the company and the change endorsed on the policy,
will ot prevent the changes from becoming effective.Y It Mh sufficient, even, if the insured gives the application for change to the
local agent of the insurer, though this local agent does not mail it
until after insured's death?' Going still further in its effort to effectuate the insured's intentions, the court has held that the failure to
send in the policy along with the application for change, was not
fatal to a change, where it would have been difficult for the insured
to have obtained the policy in order to send it to the insurer;" this
though the "difficulty" was merely one of sending word to a backwoods
community to mail or send the policy to the company or the insured.
Some attempt to comply with the policy provisions is. required.
Where there is no question of assignment, a mere oral statement of
change of beneficiary, coupled with intent to make the change formally
later, is not sufficient;2 nor is the insertion of a name on the face of
the policy.'
The consent of the original beneficiary at the time of
such informal attempt to change does not cure the defect.2 Some steps
must be taken in an attempt to notify the insurer."
The question has been somewhat complicated in Kentucky by the
court's unfortunate tendency to confuse attempts to change the
beneficiary with assignments. In Lockett v. Lockett" the insured, just
before his death, manually delivered the policy to his wife with the
iS Farley et al. v. First National Bank, 250 Ky. 150, 153, 61 S. W.
(2d) 1059, 1061 (1933).
"Hoskins v. Hoskins, 231 Ky. 5, 18, 20, S. W. (2d) 1029, 1035.
(The dissenting judge admits Kentucky's "extreme liberal interpretation".)
•2 Manning v. Ancient Order of United Workmen, 86 Ky. 136, 5
S. W. 385 (1887); Howe v. Fidelity Trust Co., Trustee, 28 Ky. Law Rep.
485, 89 S. W. 521 (1905); Vaughan's Adm. v. M. B. of A., 129 Ky. 587,
149 S. W. 937 (1912).
- Hoskins v. Hoskins, 231 Ky. 5, 20 S. W. (2d) 1029 (1929).
- Ibid. See also Farley et al. v. First National Bank, 250 Ky. 150.
61 S. W. (2d) 1059 (1933), where the custodian of the policy failed or
refused to give the policy to the insured at his request; held, change
valid, though policy not surrendered.
Spurlock v. Spurlock, 271 Ky. 70, 111 S. W. (2d) 443 (1937).
Sturges v. Sturges, 126 Ky. 80, 102 S. W. 884 (1907).
mHarden v. Harden, 191 Ky.331, 230 S. W. 307 (1921).
2 Ibid. See also the dissenting opinion in Hoskins v. Hoskins, 231
Ky. 5, 17, 20 S. W. (2d) 1029, 1034; but the majority opinion did not
deny the necessity of an attempted communication; the disagreement
was in interpreting the facts.
226
Ky. L. Rep. 300, 80 S. W. 1152 (1904).
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statement that he gave it to her for her own benefit. The wife prevailed over the named beneficiary, despite the fact the policy contained
the usual provision for written application and endorsement of change.
"A life policy ...
may be assigned or otherwise disposed of as other
choses. Conditions . . . requiring that notice of assignment be given
to the insurer . . . are not meant . . . to curtail [insured's] right to
This case has
change the beneficiary of the policy, or to assign it."'
never been overruled, and later cases of a similar nature have apparently recognized its authority.2" The court erred in the Lockett case
in not recognizing that a life insurance policy is a third party beneficiary contract, in which only the insured's interest, which ceases at
his death, is properly assignable. Perhaps the court's failure to mention the Lockett case in a recent decision involving somewhat similar
facts, indicates a change of opinion/?
An important question which remains for the future is the sufficiency of a formal application for change of beneficiary which is sent
to the insurer without the policy, though the policy is in the possession
of the insured, who omits to send it merely through oversight or
ignorance. It is submitted that in such case the insured has not "done
all that he could do to comply with the requirements",3' but it is
doubtful if the court would fail to give effect to the insured's intention
on that account.
SUMARY
In summarizing, it may be said that Kentucky will recognize an
attempted change as effectual when: the insurer has neglected or
unreasonably refused to make the change, and the insured has otherwise substantially complied with the requirements; the failure to
comply is due to the refusal of the custodian of the policy to give it up;
the insured has "substantially complied" by doing all that he could do
without difficulty to comply, even though his death occurs before any
notice reaches the company.
Jo M. FERGUSON

WILLS-EFFECT IN KENTUCKY OF ADOPTION OF A CHILD ON
A PRIOR MADE WILL
Kentucky provides by statute that when a child is born after the
execution of a will in which no provision has been made for him, the
will Is revoked to the extent that the afterborn child takes the same
share he would have taken had his parent died intestate.' This statute,
- Id. at 301, 80 S. W. at 1152.
" Harden v. Harden, 191 Ky. 331, 230 S. W. 307 (1921); Metropolitan
L. Ins. Co. v. Brown's Admr., 222 Ky. 211, 300 S. W. 599 (1927).
(But
the decision did not follow the Lockett case, on the ground the factual
situations were different.)
' Supra, note 23.
Supra, note 18.
' Kentucky Statutes (Carroll's 1936) sections 4847 and 4848; Sneed
v. Ewing, 28 Ky. (5 J.J. Marsh.) 460, 22 Amer. Dec. 41 (1831); Knut v.
Knut, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 972, 58 S. W. 583 (1900).

K. L. J.-7

